question archive Consider an n-player simultaneous moire Stag Hunt game
Consider an n-player simultaneous moire Stag Hunt game
Subject:EconomicsPrice: Bought3
Consider an n-player simultaneous moire Stag Hunt game. [An example of a Stag Hunt game is in Workshop W3] Each player has two strategies {Stagr Hare}. The payoff of Hare is] regardless of other players' strategies. To successfully hunt a stag, mhunters. with 2 s m < n, need to pursue the stag together. {Continue to assume that there is a single stag.) Assume that a captured stag is shared equally by the hunters who catch it. Under each of the following assumptions on the hunters' preferences, find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria to this game. Explain why the equilibria you identified are indeed equilibria and why there are no other equilibria. [Players move simultaneously. Assume that whoever decides to go for the stag will hunt together. For example, we do not consider the case of multiple groups of hunters competing for the stag] 01. As before. each hunter prefers the fraction {Uni of the stag to a hare. [5 points] 02. Each hunter prefers the fraction (11k) of the stag to a hare, but prefers a hare to any smaller fraction of the stagr where k is an integer with m 5 k s n. [7 points] Q3. Each hunter prefers the fraction {11k} of the stag to a harer but prefers a hare to any smaller fraction of the stag, where k is an integer with k s m. [2 points]
