Preliminary Master Thesis: Introduction The Norwegian wealth tax is a contentious topic that has undergone several changes in recent years

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Preliminary Master Thesis:

Introduction

The Norwegian wealth tax is a contentious topic that has undergone several changes in recent years. The purpose of our master thesis is to investigate the impact of these changes by conducting an empirical analysis of the wealth tax policy in Norway. Our main research question is to understand if the changes in the wealth tax policy have affected the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms in the country. Despite the varying opinions that exist on the topic, there is limited empirical research available, making it an intriguing subject to explore. Our study aims to provide new insights into the effects of wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms, and to contribute to the ongoing debate on this issue.

 

"A wealth tax can be an important tool for addressing the growing concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small elite"

Joseph Stiglitz, Economist and Professor

(Stiglitz, 2019)

 

This sentiment is supported by the fact that wealth inequality has been on the rise in many countries, including Norway, in recent years. The wealth tax has been a contentious topic in Norway, with the main political parties divided in their opinions on the tax. Consequently, Norway’s wealth tax policy has been a regularly debated topic in the media. In order to contribute to this ongoing discussion, our research aims to investigate the impact of the changes to the Norwegian wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms. Through an empirical analysis of the wealth tax policy in Norway, we hope to gain a deeper understanding of the effects of the wealth tax on key economic variables such as firm investment, emigration of high net-worth individuals and level of corporate loans.

 

Our thesis will take a quantitative approach by doing two separate difference-in-difference regressions, utilizing both corporate data and individual tax data from the period of 2007-2022. We will collect both primary and secondary data from credible databases, but also look at less credible academic papers. For our primary data collection we are going to send an application to the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) and Skatteetaten, which we hope will approve to provide us with relevant data sets.

 

In conclusion, the main goal of our research is to investigate the impact of changes to the Norwegian wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms. Through an empirical analysis of the wealth tax policy in Norway and utilizing a quantitative approach, we aim to provide new insights and contribute to the ongoing debate on the effectiveness and implications of the wealth tax. We hope to gain a deeper understanding of the effects of the wealth tax on key economic variables such as firm investment, emigration of high net-worth individuals and level of corporate loans. We believe that the outcomes of our research will hold significant weight for decision-makers and those impacted by the wealth tax, as it may shed light on the effectiveness and potential drawbacks of the wealth tax as a means of reducing wealth inequality. Our research will serve as a valuable reference for future policy-making in this realm.

Theory and Background

Many argue that the wealth tax impairs economic growth, penalizes success, and incentivizes tax avoidance and emigration. In fact, Norway is one of only a few countries in Europe that still imposes a wealth tax, with the number of countries taxing net household wealth having decreased from 12 in 1990 to just 3: Norway, Spain, and Switzerland (Thoresen et al., 2021).

 

The table below shows historical wealth tax data gathered from Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB) during the period from 2007-2022. It shows the number of individuals subject to the wealth tax, the average wealth tax payable, sum of taxes paid to state and municipality and total net wealth.

 

Year       Persons with wealth tax               Average  wealth tax (NOK)          Total wealth tax to municipality (NOK 1000)                Total government wealth tax (NOK 1000))            Total taxable net wealth (NOK 1000)

2007       1 095 098              10 700   7 828 455              3 941 222              1 365 296 221

2008       896 281 13 000   7 583 068              4 030 552              1 401 867 627

2009       777 667 15 300   7 592 412              4 321 161              1 453 134 055

2010       639 744 19 000   7 753 686              4 415 333              1 554 508 571

2011       679 536 18 800   8 119 559              4 622 361              1 635 953 020

2012       688 701 19 400   8 495 572              4 833 176              1 729 399 867

2013       644 977 21 800   8 948 898              5 090 018              1 837 343 032

2014       600 884 22 800   9 593 260              4 089 114              1 967 785 482

2015       546 353 23 600   10 635 240           2 266 828              2 168 267 336

2016       513 532 27 300   11 575 261           2 465 388              2 355 998 355

2017       524 612 29 400   12 698 355           2 710 568              2 535 660 314

2018       537 947 29 100   12 895 637           2 749 153              2 567 495 711

2019       560 020 29 600   13 682 274           2 917 087              2 789 385 520

2020       596 616 28 900   14 204 518           3 031 256              2 926 445 841

2021       667 022 27 700   15 203 782           3 250 473              3 174 706 784

2022       N/A        N/A        N/A        N/A        N/A

Source: SSB (2023)

 

As we observe from the data during this period, the number of taxable individuals have steadily decreased meanwhile wealth tax payments and total taxable wealth have increased.

 

Table 1.1: Development of the wealth tax rate during the period of year 2007-2023.

                Municipality       State

Year       Threshold            Rate       Threshold 1        Rate 1   Threshold 2        Rate 2

2007       NOK 220.000      0,70%    NOK 220.000      0,20%    NOK 540.000      0,40%

2008       NOK 350.000      0,70%    NOK 350.000      0,20%    NOK 540.000      0,40%

2009       NOK 470.000      0,70%                                   NOK 470.000      0,40%

2010       NOK 700.000      0,70%                                   NOK 700.000      0,40%

2011       NOK 700.000      0,70%                                   NOK 700.000      0,40%

2012       NOK 750.000      0,70%                                   NOK 750.000      0,40%

2013       NOK 870.000      0,70%                                   NOK 870.000      0,40%

2014       NOK 1.000.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.000.000   0,30%

2015       NOK 1.200.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.200.000   0,15%

2016       NOK 1.400.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.400.000   0,15%

2017       NOK 1.480.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.480.000   0,15%

2018       NOK 1.480.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.480.000   0,15%

2019       NOK 1.500.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.500.000   0,15%

2020       NOK 1.500.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.500.000   0,15%

2021       NOK 1.500.000   0,70%                                   NOK 1.500.000   0,15%

2022       NOK 1.700.000   0,70%    NOK 1.700.000   0,25%    NOK 20.000.000 0,40%

2023       NOK 1.700.000   0,70%    NOK 1.700.000   0,30%    NOK 20.000.000 0,40%

Source: Skatteetaten (2023)

 

The table above illustrates the historical progression of the Norwegian wealth tax rate and thresholds from 2007 to 2023. The data presented in the table pertains to individual taxpayers and the threshold represents the tax-free allowance for net income. It is worth noting that for married couples who are taxed jointly, the threshold is double the amount shown in the table (Skatteetaten, 2023). Additionally, it is important to note that while the wealth tax percentage is consistent across municipalities, there is an exception in the municipality of Bø in Vesterålen, which reduced their wealth tax rate in 2019 (Lægland & Wernø, 2021). As the table highlights, the wealth tax threshold has steadily increased over the years, resulting in fewer and fewer individuals being subject to the wealth tax policy

 

During the period of 2005-2013, the Red-Green coalition government implemented a two-tiered wealth tax system, with different rates for individuals with different levels of net wealth. The rate was 0.9% for net wealth above 220,000 NOK and 1.1% for net wealth above 540,000 NOK. In 2009, the coalition eliminated the two-tiered system and implemented a flat rate of 1.1%.

 

The center-right coalition, which came into power in 2013, lowered the rate to 1% and then further to 0.85% in 2015. However, the center-left coalition, which took power in 2022, made changes to the tax rates and thresholds. The wealth tax threshold was increased from 1.5 million NOK to 1.7 million NOK, and a second threshold was introduced for individuals with a net wealth above 20 million NOK, with a higher rate of 1.1%. In 2022, the wealth tax rate for the lower threshold was increased to 0.95 percent, while the high threshold rate remained at 1.1 percent. In 2023, the rate is scheduled to increase to 1 percent for the lower threshold, while it remains unchanged at 1.1 percent for the high threshold.

 

To better understand the changes in the wealth tax policy over time, we have presented a graphical representation of the wealth tax rate development for municipality and state separately, and combined for both thresholds during the period from 2007-2023

 

 

 

On the left-wing, the Norwegian Labor Party argues that an increase in the wealth tax rate would lead to high net worth individuals taking out less dividends from their companies, ultimately resulting in an increase in wages. They estimate that for every 1 NOK increase in wealth tax, wages within companies would increase by 0.3 NOK (Arbeiderpartiet). On the right-wing, the Conservative Party argues that the wealth tax places a burden on companies by draining them of necessary capital for investments. They also claim that the tax disproportionately impacts Norwegian owners, making them less competitive in comparison to foreign owners. Additionally, the Conservative Party takes issue with the fact that owners are required to pay the wealth tax even if the company has ended the year with a deficit. Due to these arguments, the Conservative Party advocates for the removal of the wealth tax on operational business assets (Høyre, 2022).

 

The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) argues that the wealth tax particularly affects small business owners and has negative consequences for the economy. They argue that small business owners, who are subject to the wealth tax, are forced to withdraw dividends from their companies in order to pay for it. This leads to a double taxation, which not only drains companies of capital, but also negatively impacts economic growth and job security (Wang, 2021).

Another argument against the wealth tax is emigration and tax avoidance. Several countries have removed the wealth tax due to the exit of wealthy individuals, with the latest being France in 2017 (McDougall, 2021). Because the tax makes Norwegian owners less competitive, this causes speculation and incentives for the owners to invest abroad or move out of the country to avoid the tax. During the latest years, several of the richest Norwegian owners have decided to move out of the country.

One example is Kjell Inge Røkke, owner of Aker ASA, which in September 2022 announced that he moved to Switzerland. His emigration is suspected to be due to the expected increase in wealth tax rates from 2023, as calculations imply that Røkke can save about 360 million NOK by moving to Switzerland (Bjergaard, 2022). Dagens Næringsliv, a Norwegian financial newspaper went as far as to call Røkke´s unexpected movement “A Torpedo against the Wealth Tax” (Gjems-Onstad, 2022). They expect that his movement will cause a reaction which might lead to a reduction in the wealth tax for the richest individuals or a decision to abandon the tax policy altogether (Gjems-Onstad, 2022).

 

Presentation of Research question

When forming our research question we took base in the different opinions related to the wealth tax and the issues that were most mentioned in Norwegian newspapers. Our main goal was to find a topic that was relevant, timely and less covered in previous research papers. Recently, the discussion on the wealth tax has spiked, especially after the increase in wealth tax percentage, the reimplementation of the two-tier threshold, and the emigration of several of the most wealthy individuals in Norway. It is also discussed whether the timing of the increasing wealth tax percentage is right, as Norway just recently recovered from the Covid-pandemic. Meanwhile, there is also an ongoing discussion on the effect of imposing a wealth tax on operational business assets.

 

In our master's thesis, we aim to investigate the impact of changes in the Norwegian wealth tax policy on key financial variables such as firm investment, corporate loans and emigration of high net-worth individuals. The topic is highly relevant and timely, and the progressive changes in the wealth tax rate and threshold in Norway over the years provide a unique opportunity for empirical research. Despite the ongoing debate on the topic, academic research on the effects of the wealth tax is still relatively limited, providing an opportunity for our study to make a significant contribution to the existing literature on the field.

 

Our thesis problem statement is:

What is the impact of the changes to the Norwegian wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms?

 

In our thesis we want to test the following research questions:

 

Question 1: Is there a relation between wealth tax rate changes and firm investments?

H0: Changes in the wealth tax rate have no effect on firm investments.

H1: Changes in the wealth tax rate have an effect on firm investments.

 

We expect to find a negative relationship from our analysis, which means that an increase in the annual wealth tax rate will lead to a decrease in firm investments. We expect this relationship to especially apply for smaller firms. The reason is that an increase in the wealth tax results in less excess cash for investments, because the corporate owners subject to the tax have to take out more dividends to afford it.

 

Question 2: Is there a relation between wealth tax rate changes and emigration of high net individuals?

H0: Wealth tax rate changes have no effect on emigration of high net individuals.

H1: Wealth tax rate changes have an effect on emigration of high net individuals.

 

For this question, we expect to find a positive relationship from our analysis; an increase in the wealth tax rate results in an increase in emigration of high net individuals. We expect this relation to be statistically significant for the upper threshold especially.

 

Question 3: Is there a relationship between wealth tax changes and the level of corporate loans?

H0: Wealth tax rate changes have no effect on the level of corporate loans.

H1: Wealth tax rate changes have an effect on the level of corporate loans.

 

Our expectations are to find that an increase in the wealth tax rate will result in an increase in the level of corporate loans, due to the fact that firm owners have to pay a wealth tax on operational business assets, even though their business runs with a deficit. The owners are therefore forced to take up loans in the company to afford paying out the dividend necessary to pay the tax liability. We expect this relation to be especially significant for small and medium-sized businesses.

Literature Review

The Literature Review section examines existing literature that addresses the impact of changes in the Norwegian wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms. In particular, this section evaluates the relationship between changes in the wealth tax rate and various financial outcomes, such as firm investments, emigration of high net-worth individuals and level of corporate loans. The goal of this review is to provide an understanding of the current state of knowledge on this topic and to identify any gaps in the literature that our research aims to fill. The literature review will be conducted using a systematic approach, including a thorough search of relevant academic databases and journals, to ensure that relevant literature is included in the review.

 

Relation between wealth tax rate changes and firm investments

A study by Advani and Tarrant (2021) found that a wealth tax can lead to a reduction in overall tax rates by 7-17% if the tax rate is levied at a rate of 1%. However, Niemann and Sureth-Sloane (2019) found that an increase in the wealth tax rate may delay or accelerate risky investments. They found that a wealth tax hike may reduce investments in start-up companies seeking low-risk investments, but accelerate investments during periods of high interest rates and reduce investments when interest rates are low.

 Bjerksund and Schjelderup (2022) conducted a study to determine the impact of a wealth tax on an investor's tax valuation in an efficient market. They found that an investor's perception of an investment is not affected by the presence of a wealth tax. However, the study's validity in associating investment decisions with wealth tax rate changes may be limited by its inability to rule out the impact of equity financing and liquidity considerations on a firm's investment decisions.

Overall, the literature suggests that wealth tax rate changes can have a significant impact on firm investments, with the effects varying depending on the design and context of the tax, as well as the method used for collecting the tax. These findings highlight the need for further research to better understand the relationship between wealth tax rate changes and firm investments.

Relation between wealth tax rate changes and emigration of high net individuals

Number of studies have found that changes in wealth tax rates can have a significant impact on the mobility decisions of high-income earners. Kleven et al. (2020) found that high-income individuals are particularly responsive to changes in wealth tax rates when making location decisions, with an increase in wealth taxes leading to greater geographic mobility to areas with lower wealth tax rates. Similarly, Agrawal and Foremny (2019) found evidence from Spain that a 1% increase in wealth tax rates increases the probability of emigration by 1.7%.

 However, other researchers have suggested that the relationship between wealth tax rates and emigration may be more complex than these studies suggest. Chamberlain (2021) has argued that emigration is more likely to occur in the presence of differential taxation rates between different regions within the same country, rather than between countries. Additionally, some researchers have suggested that other factors, such as economic growth, political stability, and quality of life, may be more important drivers of emigration than wealth tax rates.

 

Overall, it is clear that the relationship between wealth tax rate changes and emigration of high net individuals is a complex one, influenced by a variety of factors. Further research is needed to better understand the nuances of this relationship and its implications for policymakers.

 

Relationship between wealth tax changes and the level of corporate loans

In addition to the findings mentioned above, several other studies have examined the relationship between wealth tax changes and the level of corporate loans. A study by Huizinga and Laeven (2018) found that a reduction in wealth tax rates leads to an increase in corporate borrowing. This is because businesses have access to more capital as a result of lower wealth tax rates, which allows them to invest in new projects and expand their operations.

Similarly, a study by Devereux and Griffith (2015) found that higher wealth taxes lead to lower levels of corporate investment, which in turn leads to a decrease in the level of corporate loans. The authors argue that this is because high wealth taxes make it more difficult for businesses to access capital, which limits their ability to invest in new projects and expand their operations.

Furthermore, research by Joulfaian (2009) found that the wealth tax has an effect on the cost of capital for businesses. The study suggests that by raising the wealth tax, it increases the cost of capital for businesses and therefore limits the ability of firms to raise capital. This can lead to a reduction in investments and therefore a decrease in the level of corporate loans

Taken together, these studies provide strong evidence that wealth tax changes have a significant impact on the level of corporate loans. An increase in wealth tax leads to a decrease in the amount of capital available for businesses, which leads to an increase in corporate loans as businesses are forced to accrue more loans to fund their operations. Additionally, wealth tax limits the business’ entrepreneurial activities, which results in a decrease in corporate loans.

Research methodology

In order to examine the effects of alterations in the wealth tax on emigration and firm behavior, we will utilize a quantitative methodology by conducting regression analyses on data sets. Specifically, we will employ STATA as our statistical software for performing the regressions and calculations. Additionally, we will utilize Microsoft Excel to generate tables and figures to visually present the results.

Approach:

For our research, we will employ a quasi-experimental approach. A quasi-experiment, as described by Wooldridge (2020), is a type of natural experiment that occurs as a result of an exogenous event, such as a change in government policy (Wooldridge, 2020, p. 434). This method allows us to assess the impact of a specific intervention, in this case the wealth tax, by comparing a group that has been exposed to the intervention to a control group that has not. In doing so, we can establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the dependent and independent variables. However, unlike a true experiment, a quasi-experiment does not rely on randomized assignment to assign subjects to groups, but instead utilizes alternative non-random methods (The World Bank Group, 2023). Since randomization is not employed, this approach presents certain limitations. Therefore, we will aim to collect data from a larger sample to ensure valid and unbiased estimates.

Difference-in-difference:

The quasi-experiment we are utilizing is a difference-in-difference regression regression, which entails comparing the change in an outcome before and after an intervention for a treatment group that is affected by the intervention and an unaffected control group. For our regression analysis, we will introduce two treatment groups which represent the lower and upper wealth tax thresholds during our chosen period. The control groups will be defined as the threshold for the tax-free allowance.

 

Our preferred approach for conducting the difference-in-difference regression is to base it on the wealth of the largest owners. However, collecting data on the wealth of company owners may prove challenging as it is sensitive information. Additionally, many of the majority shareholders of firms listed on the stock exchange have gained control through pyramiding, resulting in many of the largest shareholders being "empty" holding companies. Due to these factors, collecting this data may be difficult.

 

In an alternative approach, we will form our treatment and control groups through propensity score matching (PSM). This method involves creating artificial control groups by matching treated and non-treated units that have similar properties. This results in a propensity score, which measures the probability that a unit will participate in the intervention (The World Bank Group, 2023). Given that larger firms are more likely to have owners subject to the wealth tax, we will consider them as the treatment group. For the second treatment group, which represents the upper threshold, we will include the OSE listing status. As for the control group, we will use small firms. The EU has their own criteria for defining small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), which includes factors such as number of employees, turnover and assets. However, we will use the definitions provided by NHO, which classifies small, medium-sized and large businesses as firms with 1-20, 21-100 and above 100 employees respectively (NHO).

 

To analyze the impact of the wealth tax on emigration, we will conduct a difference-in-difference regression analysis using individual tax data. We will establish four treatment groups: individuals with taxable wealth above the lower threshold and individuals with taxable wealth above 20 million, 100 million, and 500 million, respectively. The control group will consist of individuals with no taxable wealth.

Limitations and restrictions:

Our research will focus on the total wealth tax payable and we have not delved into the composition of direct ownership and discounts of assets subject to the tax, such as housing, property, shares, fixed assets and other assets. Additionally, our research is limited to testing our hypotheses, and there may be other impacts of the change in wealth tax policy that we have not addressed in our thesis. Furthermore, since the wealth tax is based on the previous income year, it is likely that we will not be able to obtain wealth tax data for 2022 in time, and we will have to base our analysis on previous periods.

Data Collection

In this master thesis, we aim to conduct a quantitative analysis of the impact of changes to the Norwegian wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms. To do this, we will gather both primary and secondary data from various sources. Our primary sources will include statistical data sets from credible pages such as Proff.no, SSB, Skatteetaten and Bloomberg, as well as firm-specific data from the Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR). For our analysis on emigration, we will also apply for individual data for wealth and wealth taxes from Skatteetaten, ensuring that the identities are not traceable in accordance with GDPR principles.

 

CCGR can provide a variety of firm-specific data that can be used for your analysis of the impact of the changes to the Norwegian wealth tax on the financial behavior and performance of high net-worth individuals and firms. Some variables we consider obtaining from CCGR include:

·               Accounting variables, such as return on investment (ROI), investments, assets, and liabilities.

·               General data, such as the number of employees and the firm's listing status on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).

·               Information on firm ownership, such as the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders, and whether they have gained control through pyramiding.

·               Data on the firm's debt-to-equity ratio, and its level of leverage.

·               Data on the firm's dividend policy, and whether it pays out dividends to shareholders.

·               Data on the firm's performance, such as its net income, revenues, and operating income.

.               Individual data for net wealth and wealth tax payable.

 

We are aware that not all of the data may be available for the specific time period of our research and also to discuss with the supervisor for any other variables that he recommends or any changes that should be made.

 

For secondary data, we will search academic papers listed on credible databases such as Web of Science, Google Scholar, JSTOR and other databases. Due to the limited number of academic papers available on the wealth tax, we may also need to consult less credible sources, but we will use them only indicatively and not base our conclusions on them.

 

Project organization, management and timeline

This paper is a collaboration between two students, each bringing unique expertise, knowledge, and skills to the project. By utilizing these strengths, we will be able to efficiently divide our tasks and work together effectively on tasks that require collaboration. If necessary, we will also take steps to acquire additional knowledge and understanding of relevant subjects to ensure the quality and success of our research process.

 

We will use a Gantt chart, a project management tool, to outline and track the different stages of our master thesis development as outlined by Bryman and Bell (2011). The Gantt chart will serve as a guide for our progress and will help us to stay on track with our deadlines, even if some stages may take more or less time than anticipated. Deadlines will be adhered to strictly.

 

 

In addition to using the chart, we will also utilize the Microsoft To Do task management application to manage our time effectively. This application has been used previously for our term papers and assignments, and it has proven to be a highly effective tool for managing time. By using this application, we will be able to assign tasks to one another, manage unexpected tasks, and keep track of the progress of our master's thesis in an efficient manner.

 

 

 

 

References

 

Advani, A., & Tarrant, H. (2021). Behavioural responses to a wealth tax. Fiscal Studies, 42(3-4), 509-537. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12283

 

Wooldridge, J. M. (2020). Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach (7th edition). Cengage Learning Inc.

 

Regjeringen.no. (2022, December 12), Skattesatser 2023. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/okonomi-og-budsjett/skatter-og-avgifter/skattesatser-2023/id2929581/

 

Agrawal, D. R., & Foremny, D. (2019). Relocation of the rich: Migration in response to top tax rate changes from Spanish reforms. Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(2), 214-232.  https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00764

 

Arbeiderpartiet. Formuesskatt. Retrieved 2023, January 15 from: https://www.arbeiderpartiet.no/politikken/formuesskatt/

 

McDougall, M. (2021, February 11). Lessons From History: France's Wealth Tax Did

 

More Harm Than Good. Investors Chronicle.  https://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/education/2021/02/11/lessons-from-history-france-s-wealth-tax-did-more-harm-than-good/

 

Anesa, M., Gillespie, N., Spee, A. P., & Sadiq, K. (2019). The legitimation of corporate tax minimization. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 75, 17-39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2018.10.004

 

NHO. (2021, October 26). Formuesskatt på Arbeidende Kapital er Feil Medisin. https://www.nho.no/tema/skatter-og-avgifter/artikler/formuesskatt-pa-arbeidende-kapital-er-feil-medisin/

 

Bjerksund, P., & Schjelderup, G. (2022). Investor asset valuation under a wealth tax and a capital income tax. International Tax and Public Finance, 29(4), 873-889. DOI:10.1007/s10797-021-09691-0

 

Høyre. (2022, December 4). Formuesskatt på Arbeidende Kapital. https://hoyre.no/politikk/var-politikk/naeringspolitikk/formuesskatt-pa-arbeidende-kapital/

 

Chamberlain, E. (2021). Who should pay a wealth tax? Some design issues. Fiscal Studies, 42(3-4), 599-613. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12284

 

Gjems-Onstad, O. (2022, September 12). Røkkes Flytting - En Torpedo Mot Formuesskatten. Dagens Næringsliv. https://www.dn.no/innlegg/skatt/formuesskatt/kjell-inge-rokke/rokkes-flytting-en-torpedo-mot-formuesskatten/2-1-1296995

 

Kleven, H., Landais, C., Munoz, M., & Stantcheva, S. (2020). Taxation and migration: Evidence and policy implications. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34(2), 119-42. DOI: 10.1257/jep.34.2.119

 

Huizinga, H., & Laeven, L. (2018). Corporate tax avoidance and firm conduct. Journal of Economic Literature, 56(2), 389-452.

 

Devereux, M. P., & Griffith, R. (2015). Corporate income tax reform and the burden of debt. Journal of Public Economics, 128, 1-19.

 

Joulfaian, D. (2009). The effects of income taxes on the location of high-income earners: Evidence from the U.S. states. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 94-108.

 

Høyre. (2022, December 4). Formuesskatt på Arbeidende Kapital. https://hoyre.no/politikk/var-politikk/naeringspolitikk/formuesskatt-pa-arbeidende-kapital/

 

Leenders, W., Lejour, A., Rabaté, S., & Van’t Riet, M. (2023). Offshore tax evasion and wealth inequality: Evidence from a tax amnesty in the Netherlands. Journal of Public Economics, 217, 104785. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104785

 

Bjergaard, A. P. (2022, September 12). Vil Spare Rundt 360 Millioner i Årlig Formuesskatt. Finansavisen. https://www.finansavisen.no/nyheter/finans/2022/09/12/7928056/kjell-inge-rokke-vil-spare-rundt-360-millioner-i-arlig-formuesskatt?zephr_sso_ott=XNxMle

 

Londoño-Vélez, J., & Ávila-Mahecha, J. (2021). Enforcing wealth taxes in the developing world: quasi-experimental evidence from Colombia. American Economic Review: Insights, 3(2), 131-48. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200319

 

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