Read the argument in the following text box.

Let us now turn our attention to the justification for systems of punishment. We know all too well that a system of legal punishment will on occasion convict and punish by mistake individuals who are innocent in the sense just discussed. To admit this is merely to admit that well-intentioned human beings are fallible and imperfect and that, as a consequence, their legal systems will reflect these characteristics. Now, we can understand that retributivists (and apparently Kant was one of these) might not be cognizant of this fact and support a system of punishment, believing (naively) that no innocent person would ever suffer at the hands of the system. But, once a retributivist fully appreciates the significance of human imperfection, such a thinker cannot consistently advocate the establishment of systems of legal punishment and yet condemn the establishment of systems of telishment. The principle that it is wrong to support systems which are known to inflict suffering on innocent people requires that we support neither. Thus, retributivists who would support systems of legal punishment are subject to the same moral criticism that they lodge against utilitarians who would administer a system of telishment: such people support systems that they know will condemn innocent people. Schedler, “Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?” (The Monist, April 1980).

It has been suggested that there is a fallacy of equivocation in this argument. Identify the term that is the source of the equivocation and explain the shift in meaning. You may find a hint in Rawls’ article “Two Concepts of Rules”

Answer:

We will interpret retributivists as maintaining to the rule that frameworks in which government purposely purpose enduring at the guiltless are unjustifiable. Moreover, due to the fact that fairness is a superseding an incentive for retributivists, they have to likewise keep that it's far indecent to emotionally supportive networks which we comprehend will dispense enduring at the blameless.Allow us currently to direct our attention in the direction of the legitimization for frameworks of field. We recognize thoroughly that an association of lawful field will once in a while convict and rebuff by chance folks who are guiltless withinside the experience simply examined. To concede that is simplest to concede that benevolent people are frail and improper and that, as an outcome, their standard units of legal guidelines will reflect those attributes. Presently, we are able to realise that retributivists (and obviously Kant changed into one in all those) in all likelihood may not be discerning of this fact and backing an association of field, accepting (gullibly) that no guiltless character should at any factor undergo attributable to the framework. However, whilst a retributivist absolutely values the which means of human blemish, any such pupil can not reliably recommend the inspiration of frameworks of valid field however then censure the inspiration of frameworks of telishment.

The rule that it isn't always proper to emotionally supportive networks which might be recognised to actual enduring on sincere people necessitates that we uphold now no longer one or the other. In this manner, retributivists who may emotionally supportive networks of lawful field are established upon the superb evaluation that they prevent towards utilitarians who may adjust an association of telishment: such people emotionally supportive networks that they comprehend will denounce innocent people.