question archive Consider three bidders who have private values that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 100
Subject:EconomicsPrice:2.87 Bought7
Consider three bidders who have private values that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 100. Suppose that these values happen to be vi = 25, v2 = 30, and v3 = 10.
Then the equilibrium price in the second-price auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20.
(continued) The equilibrium price in the first-price auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20.
(continued) The equilibrium price in the English auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20.
(continued) The equilibrium price in the Dutch auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20.
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