question archive We discussed 3 potential ways that spouses might jointly decide how to allocate time between household production, working for pay, and leisure
We discussed 3 potential ways that spouses might jointly decide how to allocate time between household production, working for pay, and leisure
Subject:EconomicsPrice: Bought3
We discussed 3 potential ways that spouses might jointly decide how to allocate time between household production, working for pay, and leisure. Which of the following is an example of the 'cooperative game' joint-decision making processes:
a. Partner A understands that, no matter what, partner B is going to work full time for pay. Partner A responds by prioritizing household production, which A enjoys more.
b. Partner A and B both enjoy working, but have to care for a child at home. Every year they sit down and plan how many hours each will work in an average week based on who earns more.
c. Partner A and B both enjoy working, and also enjoy working in their greenhouse together. Their schedules seem to line up most days so that they can spend a few hours together gardening.
d. Partner A decides that partner B will work stay home while A works in an office. B would get a lower wage than A if they went to work for pay, so they let A make this decision for them.
As the firm increases its employment, it is typically assumed that the marginal product of labor will eventually decline. An economic reason for why this occurs is that:
a. The law of diminishing returns applies.
b. An increase in employment causes the wage to fall and this, in turn, causes workers to exert less effort.
c. At some point, additional units of labor bring about a smaller change in total output than previous units did.
d. Each additional worker has a smaller share of capital with which to work.
Consider a firm which is a price taker in all markets. Assume the price of labor (W) equals $10 and the price of capital (K) equals $36. Also suppose that at the current mix of labor and capital, MPL = 5 and MPK = 12. If the firm is acting optimally, it will:
a. Leave L and K unchanged.
b. Increase both L and K.
c. Decrease L and increase K.
d. Increase L and decrease K.
If the economy enters a recession which increases unemployment, and then the labor force grows
a. The added-worker effect has dominated the discouraged worker effect, and the unemployment rate will grow even more.
b. The added-worker effect has dominated the discouraged worker effect, and the unemployment rate growth will be hindered.
c. The discouraged worker effect has dominated the added-worker effect, and the unemployment rate will grow even more.
d. The discouraged worker effect has dominated the added-worker effect. The unemployment rate will return to pre-recession levels.
It is determined that tech workers in Silicon Valley face substantial job-switching costs and that Silicon Valley tech firms likely have monopsony power. If Congress increased the minimum wage for tech workers, then in the Silicon Valley labor market for tech workers:
a. Employment and wages would increase.
b. Wages would increase, but employment would fall.
c. Wages would increase, but the impact on employment is uncertain.
d. The impact on both wages and employment is uncertain.
In which situation would it be profitable for a firm to pay for a worker's general training?
a. When the worker can change jobs easily.
b. When the worker is nearing retirement.
c. When the training increases the quasi-fixed cost of the employee
d. When employee mobility costs are high.
