IN recent years it has been argued that the expression "work of art" cannot be defined and Morris Weitz has even argued that érinp an artifact is not a necessary condition for being a work of art

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IN recent years it has been argued that the expression "work of art" cannot be defined and Morris Weitz has even argued that érinp an artifact is not a necessary condition for being a work of art.' More recently, however, Joseph Margolis has offered a definition° and Maurice Mandelbaum has made tentative suggestions about defining "art."° I shall not repeat the well-known argument of Weitz, whose views I take to be representative of those who maintain that "art" cannot be defined, but shall state his main conclusion and comment on one of his arguments. Neither shall I repeat the arguments of Margolis or Mandelbaum, but I do want to note (i) that they agree that artifactuality is a necessary condition of art, and (z) that Mandel- baum points out the significance of  the  non- exhibited characteristics of art for the definition of"art."

Weitz's main conclusion is that there are no necessary and sufhcient conditions for the definition of "art" or for any of the subconcepts of art, such as "novel," "tragedy," "painting," and so on. All of these notions are open concepts and their in- stances have "family resemblances."

Weitz rejects artifactuality as a necessary con- dition of art because we sometimes make statements such as "This driftwood is a lovely piece of sculp- ture."• We do sometimes speak this way of natural objects, but nothing follows from this fact. Weitz is confused because he takes the driftwood remark to be a descriptive statement and it is not. Weitz himself, quite correctly, distinguishes between an evaluative use and a descriptive use of "work of art,"" and once this distinction is understood it

can be seen that the driftwood remark is an evalu ation of the driftwood. But it is, of course, the descriptive sense of 'work of art ' which is at issue when the question of whether "art" can be defined is raised. I maintain that the descriptive use of "work of art" is used to indicate that a thing belongs to a certain category of artifacts. By the way, the evaluative sense can be applied to artifacts as well as nonartifacts, as when we say, "That painting is a work of art." Such remarks are not intended as tautologies.

Before going on to discuss the second condition of the definition of the descriptive sense of "art," it will be helpful to distinguish the generic concept of art from the various subconcepts which fall under it. It may very well be the case that all or some of the subconcepts of art, such as novel, tragedy, ceramics, sculpture, painting, and so on, may lack necessary and sufficient conditions for their appli- cation as subconcepts and it still be the case that "work of art," which is the genus of all these sub- concepts, can be defined. For example, there may not be any characteristics which all tragedies have which would distinguish them from comedies, satyr plays, happenings, and the like within the domain of art. Even if this were the case, in the light of the foregoing, tragedies and all other works of art would have at least one characteristic in common, namely, artifactuality. Perhaps artifactuality and some one or more other features of works of art distinguish them from nonart. If all or some of the subconcepts of art cannot be defined and, as I think is the case, "art" can be, then Weitz is right in part.

Assuming that artifactuality is the genus of art, the differentia is still lacking. This second condition will be a social property of art. Furthermore, this social propety will, in Mandelbaum's terminology, be a nonexhibited, relational property.

W. E. Kennick contends that such an approach to the definition of "art" is futile. He argues from such facts as that the ancient Egyptians sealed up paintings and sculptures in tombs to the conclusion that "The attempt to define Art in terms of what we do with certain objects is as doomed as any other."° There are several difficulties with Kennick's argument. First, the fact that the Egyptians sealed up paintings and sculptures in tombs does not entail that they generally regarded them differently from the way in which we regard them. Indeed, they might have put them there for the dead to appreciate, or simply because they belonged to the dead person, or for some other reason. The Egyptian practice does not prove a radical differ- ence between their conception of art and ours such that a definition which subsumes both is impossible. Secondly, there is no need to assume that we and the ancient Egyptians (or any other group) share a common conception of art. I would be happy to be able to specify the necessary and suflicient condi- tions for the concept of art which we have (we present-day Americans, we present-day Westerners, we Westerners since the organization of the system of the arts in or about the i8th century—I am not sure of the exact limits of the "we"). Kennick notwithstanding, we are most likely to discover the differentia of art by considering "what we do with certain objects," that is, "works of art." But, of course, there is no guarantee that any given thing we or an ancient Egyptian might possibly do with a work of art will throw light on the concept af art. Not every dotng will reveal what is required.

Arthur Danto's stimulating article, "The Art-

world,"" is helpful here. In speaking of Warhol's Brillo Carton and Rauschenberg's Bed, he writes, "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot de[s]cry—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of history of art: anartworld." What the eye cannot descry is a complicated non- exhibited characteristic of the artifacts in question. The "atmosphere" of which Danto speaks is elusive, but it has a substantial content. Perhaps this content can be captured in a definition. I shall first state the definition and then go on to defend it.

 

A work of art in the descriptive sense ii (z) on artifact

(c) upon wñirñ some society or some sub-group of a society has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation. The definition speaks of the conferring of  the status of candidate for appreciation : nothing is said about actual appreciation and this leaves open the possibility of works of art which,  for  whatever reason, are not appreciated. Also, not every  aspect of a work is included in the candidacy for ap- preciation, for  example,  the  color  of  the  back  of a  painting  is  not  ordinarily  an  object  of appreci-

ation. The problem of trñicñ aspects of a work of art are to be included within the candidacy for appreci- ation is a question which I have pursued else- where. ®

just how is the status of candidate for appreci- ation conferred ? An artifact's hanging in an art museum, a performance at a theater, and the like are sure signs that the status has been conferred. But many works of art never reach museum walls and some are never seen by anyone but the artist him- self. The status, therefore, must be conferrable by a single person's treating an artifact as a candidate for appreciation, usually the artist himself, although not always, because someone might make an artifact without ever considering it as a candidate for appreciation and the status be conferred by some other person or persons. But can status be conferred so easily ? We associate status with ceremony—the wedding ceremony and the status of being married, for example. However, ceremony is not the only way of getting married, in some jurisdictions common-law marriage is possible—a status ac- quired without ceremony. What I want to suggest is that, just as two persons can acquire the status of common-law marriage within a legal system, an artifact can acquire the status of a candidate for appreciation within the system which Danto has called "the artworld."

A number of questions arise about this notion of status of candidate for appreciation and perhaps the whole matter can best be clarified by stating them and trying to answer them. Probably the first question is: what kind of appreciation ? Surely the definition does seem to suggest that there is a special kind of "aesthetic" appreciation. Appreciation is not crucial, but something should be said about it to prepare the way for the crucial point. The kind of appreciation I have in mind is simply the kind characteristic of our experiences of paintings, poetry, novels, and the like. This remark seems to collapse the definition into circularity, but it does not because "work of art" (the term defined) does not appear in the explanation of appreciation, only subconcept terms appear. Another apparent problem is that works of art differ so much from one another—for example, comedies are very different from tragedies—that it seems unlikely that the appreciation characteristic of our experience of one kind of work has something in common with the appreciation characteristic of our experience of another kind of work. But paintings, poems, and plays are the objects of our appreciation and the fact that the objects differ considerably does not mean that the various appreciations differ. Indeed, if we mean by "appreciation" something like "in experiencing the qualities of a thing one finds them worthy or valuable," then there is no problem about the similarity of the various appreciations.

It can now be seen that appreciation will not serve to pick out the subclass of works of art from the class of artifacts—it is too broad: many artifacts which are obviously not works of art are appreci- ated. To pick out the class of works of art one must stress the conferring of the status of candidate rather than appreciation. When, for example, a salesman of plumbing supplies spreads his wares before us, he presents them for our appreciation all right, but the presenting is not a conferring of status of candidate, it is simply a placing before us. But what is the difference between "placing before" and "conferring the status of candidate ?" The differ- ence is analogous to the difference between my uttering "I declare this man to be a candidate for alderman" and the head of the election board uttering the same sentence while acting in his official capacity. When I utter the sentence it has no effect because I have not been vested with any authority in this regard. Of course the analogy is not a complete one—lines of authority in the politico-legal world are by and large explicitly defined and incorporated into law, while lines of authority (or something like authority) in the art- world are nowhere codified. The artworld carries on its business at the level of customary practice. Still there ii a practice and this defines a social institution. To return to the plumbing line, the salesman's presentation is different from Duchamp's superficially similar act of placing a urinal which he

 

christened "Fountain" in that now famous art show. The point is that Duchamp's act took place within a certain institutional setting and that makes all the difference. Our salesman of plumbing sup- plies could do what Duchamp did, that is, convert a urinal into a work of art, but he probably would not—such weird ideas seem to occur only to artists with bizarre senses of humor. Please remember that when I say "Fountain" is a work of art, I am not saying it is a good one. And in making this last remark I am not insinuating that it is a bad one either.

Duchamp's "ready-mades" raise the question— "If urinals, snowshovels, and hatracks can become works of art, why can't natural objects such as driftwood become worlu of art ?" and, of course, driftwood and other natural objects can become works of art if any one of a number of things is done to them. One thing which would do the trick would be to pick it up, take it home, and hang it on the wall. Another thing which would do the trick would be to pick it up and enter it in an exhibition. (I was, by the way, assuming that Weitz's sentence about driftwood referred to a piece of driftwood in its ordinary situation on a beach and untouched by human hand.) This means that natural objects which become works of art acquire their artifactuality (are artifactualized) at the same time that the status of candidate for appreciation is conferred on them. But perhaps a similar thing ordinarily happens with paintings, poems, and such; they come to exist as artifacts at the same time that they have conferred on them the status of candidate for appreciation. (Of course, being an artifact and being a candidate for appreciation are not the same thing—they are two properties of a single thing which may be acquired at the same time.) A somewhat more complicated case would be an artifact from a primitive culture which played a role in a religious system and which had no artistic function in the sense developed here. Such an artifact might become a work of art in our culture in a way similar to that in which driftwood might become a work of art. However, such a religious object which becomes a work of art would be an artifact in two senses, but the driftwood in only one. (I am not suggesting that something cannot be a religious object and work of art at the same time—there are many counter-instances to this in our own culture.)

A question which frequently arises in connection with discussions of the concept of art is "How are we to conceive of paintings done by individuals such asBetsy the chimpanzee from the Baltimore Zoo ?" It all depends on what is done with the paintings. (Note that I unliesitatingly call the objects paintings, although I am uncertain about their status as works of art.) For example, The Field Natural History Museum in Chicago recently exhibited some chimpanzee paintings. In the case of these paintings we must say that they are not works of art. However, if they had been exhibited a few miles away at the Chicago Art Institute they would have been works of art. (If, so to speak, the director of the Art Institute had gone out on a limb.) It all depends on the institutional setting.

In concluding, it may be worthwhile to consider in what ways the definition offered here differs from some traditional definitions. (i) It does not attempt to smuggle a conception of good art into the definition of "art." (z) It is not, to use Margolis' term, "overloaded," as is the one Margolis cites as a horrible example: "Art is a human activity which explores, and hereby creates, new reality in a

 

suprarational, visional manner and presents it symbolically or metaphoncally,l 0 as a micro- cosmic whole signifying a macrocosmic whole."11

(3)   I t does not contain any commitment to any metaphysical or unempirical theory, as contrasted with, for example, the view that art is unreal.

(4) It is broad enough so that those things generally recognized as art can be brought under it without undue strain, as contrasted with, for example, the imitation definition which involves enormous strain in trying to show that every work of art is an

imitation of something or other. (s) It takes into account (or at least attempts to) the actual practices of the artworld of the past and of the present day.

Now what I have been saying may sound like saying, "a work of art is an object of which someone has said, 'I christen this object a work of art'." And I think it is rather like that. So one can make a work of art out of a sow's ear, but of course that does not mean that it is a silk purse.'°

Required

 

Prompt: A child at elementary school puts some paint on construction paper that makes an image. She brings the paper home and gives it to her dad, who puts it up on the wall. Would Dickie say that the construction paper creation is a work of art? What conditions would have to be met if it were to be a work of art?

 

You should write in essay form with a proper introduction, body, and conclusion.

Introduction

o  Provide a thesis statement

o  Your thesis statement should take a clear position on whether you agree or not.

Body

 Exposition: Explain the relevant parts of the Dickie reading.

 Argument: Argue for your position on whether the construction paper creation counts as a work of art. To make an argument is to give reasons why you take your position.

Conclusion

o  Your conclusion should summarize your main argumentative points.

o  Restate your thesis statement here.