question archive The Vietnam Conflict and the Philippine Insurrection
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The Vietnam Conflict and the Philippine Insurrection. Write a 2750 word paper answering;
However, from a military strategic perspective, failure in the Vietnam conflict is grounded on warfare to overcome an unconventional enemy, and the behavior of limited war campaign against an enemy fighting an all-about war (Drew, 1986).  . .Evaluation of these reasons for the Vietnam conflict's failure brings out three root causes of loss. they are an underestimation of the enemy and their tactics. over-reliance on technological superiority. and the inexperienced and under-motivated young officers that led the men in actual combat with the enemy.
Underestimation of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong Guerrillas
 . . . . . . . . . . . The enemy force that the American and South Vietnamese armed forces had to contend with in the Vietnam conflict consisted of two components.  .These were the Vietcong guerrilla forces and the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA). During the initial period of the war, it was the Vietcong insurgents in South Vietnam, mainly consisting of South Vietnamese born insurgents that had fought against the French for freedom from the colonial rule which bore the brunt of the direct conflict with the American and South Vietnamese forces, using the weapons, ammunition, and other supplies received from the NVA.
 .To start with, the Vietcong numbered around just 5,000, and this made containing them easy. However, the threat of their growth and the potential danger from that was ignored at the ground level – containment was the ground-level strategy.  .This, combined with the lack of due consideration for the political and social dimensions involved in the conflict, allowed the Vietcong to grow and develop in the local populations, raising the threat they posed.  .Greater control of the Vietcong over the local South Vietnamese community combined with the infiltration into South Vietnam by larger numbers of Vietcong from the North contributed to their growth in size to a fighting force of more than 80,000 in number by 1964 (Demma, 1989).
 . . . . . . . . . . . The successes, though limited, provided confidence to the NVA army to directly involve themselves in the conflict in the South, changing the dimension of the war, through the arrival of a more regular armed force, which was demonstrated by the Tet offensive in 1968, a major operational campaign of the NVA in the Vietnam conflict.