Compare and contrast the affirmative defenses identified in this week's textbook reading, and explain and what is meant by the sentence, "The defendant is competent to stand trial." . Explain the Supreme Court case of [Jackson v. Indiana] and how it is applicable to the states and competency for criminal liability. Do you agree with the case? Why or why not?

 

Answer:

Affirmative Defenses
An affirmative defense is one where the defendant admits that he or she committed the crime but that there exists a set of facts that when proven mitigates or defeats the charges against her. The law requires that before the defendant can claim an affirmative defense, he or she:

1. must admit that they committed the crime
2. has the burden to prove the set of facts required for the defense
3. give notice of the defense in a timely manner

Why is this unusual? Because it goes against some of the most fundamental rights we have as an accused person in the United States. In our system, the prosecutor has the burden of proof to make the case beyond a reasonable doubt with no help from the defendant. This means the defendant can do nothing and say nothing, and it all rests on the prosecutor.

When raising an affirmative defense, it changes things. The defendant now has the burden of proof to prove the facts necessary to claim his or her defense and to admit to committing the underlying crime. This goes against many of our fundamental rights.

Several affirmative defenses are nationally recognized, with the more common ones being necessity, duress, self-defense, entrapment, and insanity.

Necessity
The defense of Necessity (or choice-of-lesser-evils) recognizes that the defendant is justified in violating a criminal law if (1) the defendant reasonably believes that the threat of personal harm or harm to others is imminent, (2) the only way to prevent the threatened harm is to violate the law, and (3) the harm that will be caused by violating the law is less serious than the harm the defendant seeks to avoid.

Duress
This defense is an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury, which induces a person to commit a crime. Again, homicide is not included. Duress is often viewed as a subspecies of Necessity because the defendant is faced with choosing between the lesser of two evils. The law suggests that the defendant do everything possible to escape or avoid doing the acts without being harmed. But in the strict sense, the defendant must necessarily commit a crime in order to avoid being killed or injured by the threatening party. Duress or coercion may also be raised in an allegation of rape or other sexual assault to negate a defense of consent on the part of the person making the allegation.

Self-Defense
This is the right for persons to use reasonable force or defensive force for the purpose of defending one's own life or the lives of others, including, in certain circumstances, the use of deadly force. In order to establish Self-Defense, the defendant may be required to prove that (1) defendant was not the aggressor, (2) the defendant reasonably perceived an immediate threat of bodily harm, (3) the defendant reasonably believed that defensive force was necessary to avoid the harm, and (4) the amount of defensive force used was reasonable.

Entrapment
The Entrapment defense focuses on whether the defendant was induced to commit the crime by a government agent (typically an undercover police officer) and whether the defendant would have committed the offense without the inducement. The Subjective approach to Entrapment prohibits police officers from instigating criminal acts by people NOT predisposed to commit the crime. The Objective approach to Entrapment focuses on whether the government's conduct in inducing the crime was beyond judicial tolerance.

The reason behind allowing a defense of Entrapment is to discourage law enforcement officials from taking actions to induce someone not normally disposed to commit a crime to engage in a criminal act. Claims of Entrapment are most commonly used as a defense to what some consider to be "victimless crimes," such as gambling and prostitution, committed against willing victims.

Insanity
This defense is based on evaluations by forensic mental health professionals with the appropriate test according to the jurisdiction. Their testimony guides the jury, but they are not allowed to testify to the accused's criminal responsibility, as this is a matter for the jury to decide. Being incapable of distinguishing right from wrong is one basis for being found legally insane as a criminal defense. In a majority of states, the burden is placed on the defendant, who must prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. In a minority of states, the burden is placed on the prosecution, who must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In federal court (and in Arizona) the burden is placed on the defendant, who must prove Insanity by clear and convincing evidence (18 U.S.C.S. Sec. 17(b); see also A.R.S. Sec. 13-502(C)).

When invoking Insanity as a defense, a defendant is required to notify the prosecution. In some states, sanity is determined by the judge or jury in a separate proceeding following the determination of guilt or innocence at trial. In other states, the defense is either accepted or rejected in the verdict of the judge or jury. Even if evidence of Insanity does not win a verdict of not guilty, the sentencing court may consider it as a mitigating factor.

Competence to stand trial
A defendant cannot be convicted of a crime if they are not mentally competent to stand trial. This would violate constitutional protections for defendants by denying them the right to a fair trial. Competency involves being able to understand the proceedings and play a role in their defense. A lack of competency forms a roadblock to a trial and conviction regardless of how strong the prosecution's evidence may be. It does not prevent the police from making an arrest or the prosecution from filing charges, but the proceedings cannot go further until and unless the defendant is found to be competent. Moreover, a defendant or their attorney cannot waive the issue of competency. Some states require a defense attorney to ask for a competency evaluation if they believe that there is any possibility that their client may not be competent to stand trial.

An important distinction to understand is that a competency determination applies to the defendant's current mental state rather than their mental state at the time of committing the alleged crime. Thus, it is different from a defense such as insanity. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense to the underlying crime. The proceedings can continue normally once the defendant becomes competent again.
Competency will be decided at a hearing on the defendant's fitness to stand trial. Many states provide that a psychological evaluation will be an automatic part of this process, and judges in any state can order this evaluation. A judge likely will rely heavily on the opinion of the psychologist, but they can take their own observations into account as well. They can consider the defendant's ability to understand the charges, understand the penalties that they may be facing, make decisions, and communicate with their attorney, among other indicators.

Jackson v. Indiana

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that determined a U.S. state violated due process by involuntarily committing a criminal defendant for an indefinite period of time solely on the basis of his permanent incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him.
In general, if a defendant is found incompetent to proceed to trial, the criminal proceedings are suspended. In those cases, where the charges are petty, the charges are often dropped or a plea bargain may be made in which the charges are nolle prossed if the defendant agrees to seek treatment. Otherwise, the defendant is usually committed to a psychiatric hospital for treatment until the defendant is restored to competency, at which point the trial will proceed.
Theon Jackson, a deaf-mute who could not read, write or communicate in other ways, was charged with two counts of petty theft. Competency evaluations and testimony by the evaluating doctors showed that Jackson's intelligence was too low for him to understand the nature of the charges against him, even if he were able to develop the ability to communicate, and that the prognosis for restoration of competency was "rather dim" even if he were not a deaf mute. Despite testimony that the state of Indiana had no facilities to treat Jackson's problems, Jackson was committed to a psychiatric hospital for treatment.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that Jackson's commitment under Indiana law deprived him of equal protection and violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson's commitment deprived him of equal protection because the law subjected him to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with criminal offenses. In effect, the law condemned Jackson to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment, or the opportunity for release, afforded by Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-1209 and 22-1907. The Court also held that Jackson's commitment violated his due process rights because the nature and duration of his commitment did not bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which he was committed.
However, the Court offers only general guidelines and by 1994, twenty years after the case, states still had not enacted periodic judicial review of incompetent detainees. Many states still allowed a detention period that exceeded that maximum sentence that person would have received if convicted. Further, by refusing to rule on the charges themselves, the court did not clarify the proper disposition of criminal charges pending against a person whose competency can not be restored. This means that in those states where the charges are not dismissed, the individual may not be converted to a civil status eligible for civil commitment, resulting in such an individual's continued confinement in a secure prison with little opportunity for treatment and fewer privileges.
The states indeed struggled with implementation of the intent of the Jackson decision. As an example, Vickory noted that Florida changed its statute in 1973 to require defendants found unrestorable to be declared not guilty by reason of insanity and recommitted as such, essentially ensuring an indefinite commitment. A full two decades after Jackson, Morris and Meloy identified only 20 states that specified the length of time that an incompetent defendant could be held for attempted restoration, and 30 years after the decision, Miller found that 21 states still had no effective time limit on the duration of competence restoration. It was not until 2009 that the Indiana Supreme Court, in State v. Davis, finally resolved the question of the length of time a defendant could be held for restoration, which had been left to the states in the Jackson decision. The court held that a trial court judge may unilaterally dismiss the charges of a defendant who has been held in a state hospital as incompetent to stand trial for longer than the maximum sentence of the underlying charges.

Yes I agree with the ruling in the case because the Jackson case highlighted two important issues, one with broad implications and the other with more limited impact. First, the Jackson decision brought to the fore the constitutional implications of a finding of incompetence to stand trial and the subsequent commitment for restoration of competence. These implications led to changes in many state statutes and continue to reverberate even today. Second, Jackson brought into focus the difficulties faced by deaf defendants and the mental health professionals who are either asked to determine competence to stand trial or are ordered to try to restore or, on some occasions, establish competence. Before this landmark case, pre-trial involuntary commitment of incompetent individuals often meant lengthy or even lifetime confinement in a maximum security institution with little concern for treatment. This was true even though they were neither tried for or convicted of a crime. In this case, the Court for the first time put limits on the length of time an incompetent person may be confined.