describe the concepts in psychology on conspiracy theories

The way conspiracy theories influence and are influenced by the examination of prospective evidence is an important aspect of conspiracy theories.

Step-by-step explanation

The way conspiracy theories influence and are influenced by the examination of prospective evidence is an important aspect of conspiracy theories. Some people may be more open-minded about particular explanations for events, whereas others may be looking for closure and hence dismiss a conspiracy theory. The need for cognitive closure (NFCC), degrees of confidence in real-world conspiracy theories, and the attribution of conspiracy theories to explain occurrences were all investigated in two research. A modest (N = 30) pilot study demonstrated no link between NFCC and conspiracy theories views, implying that proponents and opponents of conspiracy theories are on the same page on this issue. Evidence for and against conspiracy theories had an impact on attributions of the possibility of a conspiracy to explain a novel incident, according to a second study (N = 86). Individuals with a high level of belief in conspiracy theories tended to perceive a conspiracy explanation as more likely after reading evidence, whereas those with a low level of believe regarded it as less likely. The consequences of past beliefs in conspiracy theories were reduced when the requirement for cognitive closure (NFCC) was reduced in an experiment.

Official versions of events, conspiracy theorists claim, "shut off" the possibility of other explanations by misinterpreting or ignoring evidence (e.g., Posner, 1993; Pipes, 1997; Pastore, 2004). Those who argue against conspiracy theory accounts, on the other hand, typically claim that such theories do not stand up to scientific or reasonable scrutiny (Clarke, 2002). For the first time, we investigate the relationship between conspiracy theories and the need for cognitive closure in the current study (NFCC, Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). We also look into how evidence influences the allocation of the probability that a conspiracy theory justifies a novel event. The elements that underpin conspiracy theories—broadly defined as a set of ideas used to explain how a group of people is secretly attempting to influence or create specific events—provide rich ground for psychological research. Not only are conspiracy theories widespread and on the rise (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011), but they're also susceptible to the third-person effect, in which we assume others believe in them more than we do (Douglas and Sutton, 2008). In a societal structure where conspiracy theories are implicated in erroneous interpretations of major events (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007), are linked to mistrust of political and social institutions (Kramer, 1999), and influence behavior such as the desire to seek health care (Bird and Bogart, 2003; Tickner et al., 2010) or cooperate with the criminal justice system, conspiracy beliefs are extremely important (Parsons et al., 1999). With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Graumann and Moscovici, 1987; Swami et al., 2011), relatively few studies have attempted to study aspects and processes linked with conspiracy theories beliefs. Conspiracy theories are frequently linked to broader social and intergroup disputes, according to social psychologists, where conspiracy theories are used to justify and maintain conflict or to assign blame to an unjust social structure (Crocker et al., 1999). Other studies have attempted to explain the popularity of conspiracy theories by concentrating on conspiracy theorists' psychological traits. A sense of impotence and anomie—the inability to impact change and emotions of insignificance in society—have been found to be positively correlated with high levels of conspiracy theory belief, among other things (Hamsher et al., 1968; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Bruder et al., 2013).

The picture appears more complicated when it comes to other components of personality. McHoskey (1995) discovered a link between authoritarian tendencies and belief in conspiracy theories (arguing that individuals with authoritarian attitudes are more likely to perceive Government as legitimate and morally inscrutable). However, (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999) discovered a favorable link between right-wing authoritarianism and conspiracy theories among people who scored high on the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, 1988). In various circumstances, political orientation and views may impact conspiracy beliefs in various ways. Swami (2012) discovered a positive association between right-wing authoritarianism and anti-Jewish conspiracy theory beliefs, but a negative relationship with general conspiracy theory beliefs. Individuals may select and choose theories that align with their political or religious beliefs (e.g., Leman, 2007; Wood et al., 2012).

Individuals' interpretations and challenges to the authenticity of evidence are heavily influenced by conspiracy theories (e.g., Harrison and Thomas, 1997; Leman, 2007). For example, heuristics like attributing a large event to a major cause could explain why conspiracy theories are attributed to explain major public events (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007). Once conspiratorial views have been developed, people may be hesitant to consider or accept contradictory data (confirmation bias, e.g., Klayman and Ha, 1987). However, the same psychological processes of resistance to conflicting information can be found across other domains of thinking, and the same psychological processes of resistance to contradictory information could just as well apply to anti-theorists. It's also clear that contradictory evidence might be interpreted in a variety of ways. While high-quality empirical data will usually settle dispute (Lord et al., 1979), ambiguous or suspect evidence is vulnerable to interpretations based on confirmation heuristics (see also Klayman and Ha, 1987) and a need to minimize dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Furthermore, data that is believed to confirm an individual's existing ideas is typically unquestioned and accepted, but evidence that is deemed to contradict those beliefs is frequently rigorously scrutinized and rejected.  As a result, the cognitive dissonance between attitude and evidence is reduced. As a result, the same data can frequently be used to support both sides of a debate.

In a chaotic society, the appeal of conspiracies

To select what they should believe, people utilize cognitive shortcuts, which are essentially unconscious rules-of-thumb that help them make decisions faster. According to Marta Marchlewska, a social and political psychologist at the Polish Academy of Sciences who researches conspiracy theories, those experiencing anxiety or a sense of disorder, who desire cognitive closure, may be even more reliant on those cognitive shortcuts to make sense of the world.

According to a recent poll, more than half of Americans experienced greater stress as a result of the pandemic. "It's not surprising that we're seeing a jump in conspiracy theories now" because of the discomfort, says Karen Douglas, a social psychologist at the University of Kent in England. Individuals who are uneasy in their relationships and who seek to catastrophize life's difficulties are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, according to her research.

Many of the current conspiracy theories attempt to explain the pandemic itself. Residents from the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Mexico were given statements containing common disinformation and facts regarding COVID-19 in a research published in October by van der Linden and colleagues.

While the vast majority of participants correctly identified bogus information, some people quickly accepted the lies. The assertion that the coronavirus was developed in a laboratory in Wuhan, China was believed by between 22 and 37 percent of respondents (depending on the country). Some even slandered accurate information, such as the fact that diabetes raises your chance of COVID-19-related serious disease.

Participants who believed false information were also less likely to follow COVID-19 health recommendations, such as wearing masks, and were more likely to indicate vaccine apprehension. According to Jan-Willem van Prooijen, a social psychologist at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, "the finding complements a body of research that indicates people's readiness to embrace bogus news can have genuine behavioral impacts."

People are also more inclined to believe misinformation that they are repeatedly exposed to, such as suspicions of election fraud or assertions that COVID-19 is no more deadly than the flu, according to experts. "The brain confuses familiarity with truth," explains van der Linden.