question archive Read the following selection
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Read the following selection. On a separate sheet of paper, make a list of key dates and events.
Introduction to The Origins of the Cold War
Be prepared to share your list in a class discussion,
The Second World War alliance of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and Great Britain crumbled quickly in 1945 after the defeat of Germany
and Japan. Soon a different kind of war—the Cold War—troubled international relations. The United States and the Soviet Union, the primary
adversaries in this new contest for world power, entered a bitter. decades-long competition for spheres of influence, economic and strategic advantage,
nuclear-weapons supremacy, control of international organizations, and
ideological superiority.
The two competitors never sent their troops into battle directly against
one another but instead engaged in an intense, expensive armaments race,
armed and aided their allies and client states, intervened in civil wars by
supporting different factions, built rival alliance systems, sponsored exclusionist foreign economic programs, and initiated noisy propaganda
campaigns—all of which divided much of the world into rival blocs or
empires (popularized too simply as "the West" and "the East"). If the Soviets
came to fear "capitalist encirclement," Americans complained against an
"international communist conspiracy." Each side, in mirror image, saw the
other as aggressive and intransigent. The Cold War contest became the
dominant feature of international relations. From the start, however, many
newly independent nations in the southern half of the globe—eventually
called the Third World—preferred not to choose sides. They became the
objects of keen superpower attention as they created another pole of power
in the already volatile international system.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s. as stunning political changes were
sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of Soviet
Premier Mikhail S, Gorbachev's new policies of glasnost and perestroika,
many people began exulting that the United States had won the Cold War.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 and the widespread
discrediting of communist ideology that accompanied its demise, some
commentators in the United States assumed an air of triumph. They
attributed their nation's seeming victory in its near half-century struggle
with the Soviet Union to the inherent superiority of American values and
institutions, Other observers remained more skeptical. They pointed to the
huge military arsenals that remained in the United States and Russia, each
of which maintained enough nuclear weapons to destroy people and property in awesome numbers. Other analysts pointed to America's daunting
domestic problems to argue that the Cold War had no winners. These
questions of Cold War demise and Cold War victory cannot be answered
without knowing what the Cold War was and how and why it began...
For those contemporaries who knew their history, the escalating Soviet
American friction after the Second World War was not unexpected. Indeed,
prolonged antagonism had marked the Soviet-American relationship since
the Russian or Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Virulent anticommunism had
long coursed through domestic American politics, much as a deep suspicion
of capitalist nations like the United States had typified Soviet leadership.
The Bolshevik government that took power in 1917 espoused a Marxist
anti-capitalist ideology, championed the world revolution. repudiated czarist
debts (much owed to Americans), and confiscated American-owned property.
President Woodrow Wilson's goal of a liberal, capitalist international order
seemed threatened by what he called the "poison of Bolshevism." In 1918
many Americans found another reason to dislike Moscow's new regime when
Soviet leaders withdrew their weary nation from the First World War by accepting a harsh peace from Germany. Wilson worked to topple or at least
to contain the Soviets by refusing to recognize the new government, aiding
anti-Bolshevik forces, restricting trade, sending thousands of American
troops into Soviet Russia, and excluding the upstart nation from the
postwar peace conference in Paris. At home, the Wilson administration
further demonstrated its vigorous anticommunism by suppressing radicals
in the Red Scare of 1919—1920. From the birth of the Soviet experiment,
then, Soviet-American relations suffered deep fissures...
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, he reasoned
that the nonrecognition policy had failed and that improved relations would
stimulate trade (helping to pull America out of the Great Depression) and
deter Japanese expansion in Asia. He subsequently struck several agreements with the Soviets, including United States recognition, The first
American embassy in the Soviet Union opened in 1934. But relations
remained strained. Official and public opinion in the United States registered sharp disapproval of Joseph Stalin's bloody purges, collectivization
of agriculture, and brutal efforts to modernize the Soviet economy. Ameri-
cans, moreover, feared that the Soviets were fomenting revolution through
the Comintern.
Especially upsetting to the United States was the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact,
which stamped the Soviet Union as one of the aggressors (indeed, it soon
seized part of Poland and attacked Finland) responsible for the outbreak
of the Second World War. Americans rejected the Soviet argument that
Great Britain and the United States, by practicing appeasement toward
Adolf Hitler's Germany had left the Soviet Union little choice but to make
peace with Berlin to buy time to prepare for an expected German
Lend-Lease aid to the beleaguered Soviets (by war's end the assistance would
total $11 billion), calculating that they could hold down scores of German
divisions in the east and hence ease German pressure against Britain in
the west.
After the United States, itself entered the Second World War in December
1941. it formed a Grand Alliance with the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
Always tension-ridden, this coalition of convenience for national survival
was held together by the common objective of defeating the Axis. The Allies
differed frequently over the timing for the opening of a second or western
front. Numerous American promises. followed by delays. angered Moscow,
Roosevelt, Stalin, and Winston S. Churchill—the Big Three—met at several
wartime conferences to devise a military strategy and to map plans for the
postwar era, At Teheran (1943) they agreed to open the second front in early
1944 (it finally came in June in France); at Bretton Woods (1944) they
founded the World Bank, and at Dumbarton Oaks {1944) they planned the
United Nations Organization, granting only the United States, the Soviet
Union, and three other nations veto power in the Security Council.
In February 1945, as the Red Army was fighting through Eastern Europe
into Germany, the three leaders met again at the Yalta Conference. In a
series of trade-offs. which included a coalition government in Soviet-
dominated Poland, the division of Germany into zones, and Soviet agreement
lo negotiate a treaty with United States ally Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)
in China, the Big Three seemed to have reached an accord on major postwar
issues...)
Define the italicized words on the previous handout and in the following reading. Write only short
An Analysis
definitions. Use your textbook and a dictionary to help you.
. . . Hopes for continued Soviet-American cooperation were soon
dashed. , as the Allies jockeyed for international influence at the war's
close. The Potsdam Conference of July 1945, after the defeat of Germany
and just before the collapse of Japan. saw as much disagreement as
agreement. Nor did the Soviets' fulfillment in August of their Yalta pledge
to enter the war against Japan improve relations, because it came after the
American atomic bombing of Hiroshima, a point when United States leaders
no longer desired Soviet participation.
Disputes broke out with alarming frequency on a wide range of issues
in the early postwar years. The American destruction of two Japanese cities
by atomic bombs posed a significant diplomatic question: Would international control follows, or would the United States retain its atomic monopoly
to gain negotiating advantage on postwar issues? How and by whom
the economies of war-ravaged nations would be reconstructed also divided
the victors. Eastern Europe became a diplomatic battleground as Soviet
influence solidified in the region. So did Iran, where American influence
had grown to challenge Soviet influence in a nation bordering the Soviet
Union. Unstable politics and economic distress rocked Western Europe.
where left and right faced off. The French. British, Americans, and Soviets
squabbled over how to extract reparations from a hobbled Germany and over
whether Germany's economy should be revived. The division of Germany
became permanent as the occupying powers created separate economic and
political institutions in their zones. In the new United Nations and World
Bank, Americans quickly established domination, prompting the Soviets to
use their veto in the first and to turn down membership in the second.
European imperialists against native independence movements, a full-scale
the civil war in China, the American-directed occupation and ultimate restoration of Japan, and widespread economic dislocation produced further
instability in world politics. The turmoil also shook the Middie East, sparked
by the Arab-Israeli dispute and lingering resentments against European
imperialism and fueled by American-Soviet competition for access to rich
oil reserves and strategic sites. The Truman Doctrine (1947), Rio Pact
(1947), Marshall Plan (1948). and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949)
stood as hallmarks of the American containment doctrine designed to
thwart, if not roll back, Soviet power and influence. For their part. the
Soviets knitted together into an empire several Eastern European states,
first in the Molotov Plan (economic} and then through the Warsaw Pact
(military). As well. a war of hyperbolic words echoed through diplomatic
chambers. Each side characterized the other as the world's bully; each side
blamed the other for the deterioration of the Grand Alliance and the
beginning of the Cold War.
. . . [Within the two major schools of thought—the traditional and
the revisionist—disagreement abounds, although historians have narrowed
some of their interpretive differences over time. Much of the debate still
centers on one question: Whose fault was the Cold War? Scholars are
moving beyond that simple query to examine shared responsibility for the
Cold War, the contributing role of nations other than the United States
and the Soviet Union, and the nature of the conflict-ridden international
system. Bul the question of blame remains at the forefront of the debate.
Until the 1960s the traditional or orthodox interpretation of the origins
of the Cold War prevailed. This point of view held that the Soviets, with
unlimited ambitions for expansion. an uncompromising ideology and a
paranoid dictator bent on world domination and the elimination of demos-
racy and capitalism, wrecked the postwar peace. Moscow caused the Cold
War, pure and simple. This view goes on to explain that the United States,
lacking self-interest and committed to democracy and high ideals, rejected
a spheres-of-influence approach in favor of an open world, passed up
opportunities to grab power after the war, and sought continued friendly
relations with the Soviet Union. As the Cold War emerged, traditionalists
have argued. negotiations with the Soviets and their communist allies
elsewhere, as in China, proved useless. Forced by communist hostility and
aggression to take defensive measures, the Harry S Truman administration
declared the ultimately successful containment doctrine and blunted com-
communist aggression. The Soviets acted: the Americans reacted. Moscow exploited;
Washington saved. Not only did policymakers like President Truman explain
events this way; until the 1960s most historians did as well.
In the early 1960s, three important changes coincided to invite a very
different interpretation—the revisionist—of the origins of the Cold War.
First, in the late 1950s the decline of McCarthyism, a virulent version of
the Cold War anticommunism, calmed the repressive atmosphere whipped
up by the Wisconsin senator and by the Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower
administrations. That atmosphere had stymied discussion of alternative
interpretations, for the Cold War consensus treated dissent as something
close to disloyalty, Indeed, unorthodox opinion sometimes earned a scholar
a trip to the intimidating hearings of the House Un-American Activities
Committee. With the decline of McCarthyism came more questioning of
traditional assumptions, as when William Appleman Williams published his
provocative book The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959). which depicted
the United States not as an innocent simph_reacting_ts-overseas-events
but rather as a self-conscious, expansionist nation with imperial drives.
The second source for revisionism was the Vietnam War. By the mid-
In the 1960s that tragic conflict had stimulated debate not only on the origins
and conduct of the war but on the Cold War assumptions that compelled
American intervention in Vietnam and around the globe. What was the
precise nature of the threat posed by communism? Who exactly was the
enemy? Was the containment doctrine too vaguely defined and indiscriminately applied? How did Americans get started in their Cold War globalism?
Were the foreign-policy assumptions judged by many to be wrong-headed
in the 1960s also wrong-headed in the 1940s? To question the Vietnam War
was to question American ideas and behavior in the early Cold War.
The third factor that inspired doubts about the Cold War consensus
was the declassification and opening to scholars in the 1960s and later of
documents from the early Cold War period—National Security Council
reports, presidential memoranda, briefing papers, telegrams from embassies,
diaries, and more. Historians could now test their questions against the
rich documentary record: they would no longer have to rely upon the often
inaccurate and self-serving memoirs of policymakers. The once-secret pa-
pers examined at a time of questioning permitted by the decline of McCarthyism
and stimulated by the Vietnam War. revealed a picture of the 1940s that
did not resemble that sketched by the traditionalists.
Although revisionists, like traditionalists, have not always agreed among
themselves, the basic outline of their interpretation became clear by the
late 1960s and early 1970s. Revisionists have held that the traditional
interpretation is too one-sided, blaming alt trouble on the Soviets and
ignoring the United States' own responsibility for the conflict. The United
States was not simply reacting to Soviet machinations; rather, it was acting
on its own needs and ideas in a way that made American behavior alarm
not just the Soviets but some of America's allies as well. The United States.
Argue the revisionists, was not an innocent defender of democracy but a
self-consciously expansionist power in search of prosperity and security.
Americans were determined to mold a postwar world that corresponded to
their own needs. They projected their predominant power again and again.
and they too often abandoned diplomacy in favor of confrontation. Nor
should analysts apply a double standard, say the revisionists, because the
The United States was itself building spheres of influence. And if "free elections"
were good for Eastern Europe, as Americans insisted. why were they not
also good for Latin America, where the United States nurtured dictators
like Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic?
Revisionists have written too that Americans exaggerated the Soviet/
the communist threat, imagining an adversary possessing more power and
ambition than the postwar Soviet Union had. The Soviets actually suffered
serious weaknesses in their economy and military, and they were often
driven not by an unbridled thirst for an empire or ideological fervor but by
concern for security after suffering at least 20 million dead in the Second
World War. The postwar American refusal to acknowledge Soviet security
fears helped bring down the "iron curtain" in Eastern Europe. Finally. a
rigid way of thinking—globalist containment—blinded Americans so much
that they overlooked the indigenous sources of conflict {religious political.
and ethnic, for example) and failed to grasp the complexities of the world
politics.
The revisionist-orthodox debate was exciting and important because it
focused on the fundamental question of what kind of people Americans
were. Were they exceptional? selfless. anti-imperialist, acting on high principle in the face of ugly challenges to democracy? Or were they something
else, perhaps not that much different from other great nations through
history—seeking hegemony at the expense of others? Or were they a mix?
because nothing can be so simply defined?. . .!
Traditionalist and Revisionist Views
Part A.
Refer to Handouts 3 and 4 to answer the following questions.
1. What does a traditionalist believe about the Cold War?
2. What does a revisionist believe about the Cold War?
3. What are two causal (hemes that underlie Cold War relations?
Part B.
Complete the chart like the one shown below. Indicate the causal themes and the facts that
traditionalists and revisionists would use to justify (their interpretation of the events. Some of these
ideas are not readily found in the handout readings. Thus. you will have to do some original and
creative thinking to complete the chart.
Events Causal Themes Traditionalist Views Revisionist Views
1. 1917 Revolution
through 1933
2.Soviet relations with Hitler
3. D-Day and the
opening of a second
front in WWII
4. USSR going to war
with Japan
5. Dropping of the
A-bomb
6. Control of Germany
and Berlin
7. Control of Eastern
Europe
8. Control of Greece
and Turkey